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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the trends in state regulation, surveillance and
control of the internet in Asia stand to effectively reduce political
expression. A variety of international media watch and human rights
organisations have noted that since 11 September 2001, a slew of anti-
terrorism laws have been adopted in Asia which place greater restric-
tions on the internet. Laws against online pornography, gambling, hate
speech and spam have been revised to cover online political content and
mobilisation. Such measures limit and reduce the space cyberactivists
have to push the democratic agenda online. These cybersecurity meas-
ures, introduced as part of the ‘war against terrorism’, represent an
extension of already draconian regulations in South-East Asian coun-
tries.
Introduction: Post-September 11 online legislation
THE RELATIONSHIP between the growth of the internet and attemptsto control it can reveal a lot about the potential for cyber-democracy. Inthis regard it is important to note that the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001 (9-11) have speeded up efforts to control the previously
free space provided by the internet. In Asia a slew of anti-terrorism laws has
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been adopted drawing upon the UN Resolution 1373, the USA Patriot Act and
various European laws. 
Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) has called 2003 ‘a black year’ for
journalists. Asia has been declared the ‘world’s largest prison for journalists,
cyber dissidents and internet-users’. China has the biggest number of internet-
users in prison; a total of 48 at 1 January 2004. Nine cyber dissidents are jailed
in Vietnam, and according to Reporters Sans Frontiers, the country has set up
a computer research department exclusively devoted to creating internet
surveillance software (RSF, 6 January 2004).
Reporters Sans Frontieres(RSF) asserts that the internet has suffered
‘serious battering’ since 9-11 and is ‘collateral damage’ in the war against
terror (RSF, 2002: 1). The threat of ‘terrorism’ has been used in many countries
as a justification for increased security measures, including surveillance, and
a reining in of civil liberties such as freedom of expression. Following the Bali
bombing in October 2002, for example, the Indonesian Government enacted
anti-terrorism regulations, increased police powers and allowed for detention
without trial (this had previously been rejected by Parliament).
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the Privacy Inter-
national report entitled Privacy and Human Rights 2003 identified global
trends in governmental and legislative surveillance following 9-11. Those
were; increased communications surveillance; weakened data protection
regimes; increased data sharing; and increased profiling and identification.
RSF, EPIC and Privacy International are in agreement that: ‘None of the
above trends are necessarily new; the novelty is the speed with which these
policies gained acceptance, and in many cases, became law’ (EPIC & Privacy
International, 2002:  27). The asserted need to track terrorists, whose primary
use of the internet appears to be the same as us ‘non-terrorists’ – for
communication and discussion –  increased the apparent urgency of cyberspace
tracking. Ultimately, according to the RSF, ‘the presumed use of the internet
by members of the terrorist command to contact each other and prepare the
operation handed a victory to advocates of very tough security measures and
strict regulation of the internet’ (RSF 2, 2002: 4).
While much of the above discussion centres on managing the technology
in order to counter terrorist threats, one must also recognise that there are
historical tensions between technological development and democratic prin-
ciples in Asia. Hence, like other past technological innovations such as the
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radio, television, fax machines and satellite broadcasting, the internet repre-
sents a new type of medium that governments, as always, are keen to control.
The popular assertion often made by internet advocates is that content
control, a primary characteristic of the traditional state-media relationship,
cannot be as successful or far-reaching when applied to the internet. However,
this is not the case. In Asia, since 9-11, governments have tabled or passed
legislation that will enable them to track and monitor content that is put online
(Privacy International, 2003). Governments are giving electronic snooping
powers to themselves and their various agencies to spy on others.
These developments raise important questions. Can the public be reason-
ably sure about the transparency of governments, even democratic ones? How
should the rights of the individual be reconciled with the safety of the
community? Here it is important to note that important state functions like
surveillance are being sub-contracted out to private, commercial firms – in the
name of anti-terrorism.
At the international level there were concerns that the first World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS), would prompt some countries to promote
restrictions on the internet and other information technologies (Shashi Tharoor,
2003). What emerged was a joint declaration at the December 2003 WSIS in
Geneva to affirm commitment to internet freedom (WSIS,  2003). Neverthe-
less the desire of governments to restrict internet usage continues unabated.
Within national territories governments retain the legal and legitimate right to
regulate computer-mediated communication.
Within this context I will examine the relationship between new media and
democracy in the post-9-11 period. Starting with the early introduction of anti-
terrorism legislation, regimes in Asia have sought to control the political
content of the internet. Attempted government restrictions are complicated by
the fact that internet technology is evolving rapidly. To the extent that such
restrictions are successful the internet’s democratic potential is weakened.
More importantly, cybersecurity measures, introduced as part of the ‘war
against terrorism’, represent an extension of already draconian censorship and
surveillance regulations in South-East Asian countries.
Democracy, freedom of expression and new media in Asia
In the aftermath of the Second World War, reconstruction and development
took priority over political expression and participation. The rapid economic
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growth of many Asian economies in the 1980s and the rise of an urban middle
class did not result in democratic change. Instead advocates of ‘Asian Values’
argued that democracy and human rights standards were culture-specific. The
economic growth of the Asian economies was seen to validate the ‘Asian way’
of strong government, social conservatism and free market economies.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 exposed the institutional weaknesses in
the region, and generated the space for economic and political reform. In
general terms civil society held the potential to require transparency and
accountability from Asian governments. The spread of the internet, the
English language, cheaper international telephone charges and global air
travel were additionally put forward as contributors to democratic reform
(Gomez and Smith, 2003).
The expansion of freedom of expression and the decline of censorship has
often been associated with the movement towards democracy. While some
agree that in Asia there has been some movement towards democracy (AMIC,
2000), it is unclear whether this involves a decline of censorship and an
increase in freedom of expression. Historically much of the law and methods
of government media control in the region originated from colonial regimes.
Strict regulation of the media, especially with regards to political content, has
been the consistent feature. The containment of freedom of expression has
involved the use of legislation to restrict access, the proscription of content, the
exercise of influence through ownership and the inducement of self-censor-
ship. These measures were supplemented by surveillance from the police,
military and selected arms of the state bureaucracy. Tactics ranged from low-
tech letter opening and the use of informants to (what was then) high-tech
telephone tapping.
The emergence of the internet in Asia during the early 1990s, raised the
possibility that public discourse could take place without the mediation of
licensing authorities, and the gate-keeping and agenda-setting of the mass
media. Technically, individuals could communicate with each other across
geographical and political boundaries without restriction, and the movement
of text was hard to control. Consequently, traditional media censorship was
seen to have an uncertain future on the internet. Many observers were
confident that any attempt by authorities to protect data, monitor content or
censor information could be circumvented by the use of re-routing and
avoidance measures. In this regard, there were expectations that freedom of
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expression would increase and further democratic development in the region.
It is naïve, however, to equate new media technologies with democracy.
The crucial ingredients for establishing a functioning democracy are an active
citizenry, a vibrant civil society and a state that enables access to information,
privacy, human and civil rights. Many observers forget that oppositional
activism in one form or another always confronts arbitrary power. Authoritar-
ian regimes in Asia, for example, monitor and restrict the opportunities for
activists to use traditional methods of communication such as pamphleteering,
newspaper publishing, community radio, print and broadcast media. With the
advent of new information and communication technologies activists can now
avail themselves  of a variety of online and mobile communications tools. They
use these tools to mobilise people for action around a cause or issue, making
them cyber-activists. In response conservative regimes make new laws to
monitor internet usage and place restrictions on activists who use new
technologies for the purposes of advocacy.
Meanwhile several studies have concluded that initial euphoria concern-
ing the democratic potential of the internet was misplaced. It is now evident
that information technology alone cannot introduce democracy (Kalathil and
Boas, 2003). Consequently the internet is not necessarily a threat to authori-
tarian regimes. Other writers note that social engineering, de-politicisation and
self-censorship generate a politically apathetic and fearful citizenry that is
reluctant to use the internet to its optimal potential (Banerjee, 2003).
At the same time the internet is continually re-inventing itself and its
potential to contribute towards democratic change cannot be judged prema-
turely. The internet’s inherent capacity for collaboration and information
sharing, the onset of wireless technology and the growth of ‘blogging’ indicate
the opportunities for democratic activism in Asia and elsewhere. In this regard,
desktop computers have been making way for laptops and pocket PCs.  This
merging with mobile phones is putting more computing power into hand-held
devices. Hence, new media developments remain a concern for conservative
regimes
The beginnings of  internet censorship in Asia
In Asia pornography, hate speech and, later, gambling were early targets of
web-based censorship and remain ongoing themes of concern for legislators
in the region.
In 1996 the Chinese authorities legislated against pornography on the
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Internet (State Council Order No.195, 1 February 1996). Online pornography
was also prohibited under Article 5 of the Computer Information Network and
Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations (December 1997),
Article 57 of the Telecommunications Regulations Of The People’s Republic
Of China (25 September 2000) and the Measures For Managing The Internet
Information Services (25 September 2000). ASEAN representatives discussed
a possible common framework and regional body to restrict pornography on
the internet (Menon, 1999). Such measures are often complicated by varying
definitions of ‘pornography’ and by moralistic censorship regulations.  An
internet content rating system introduced to Hong Kong in 2001, for example,
classified gay and lesbian websites as ‘harmful media’. The owner of the first
and biggest gay website in the country was told to mark it as a ‘harmful site’
and install filtering software to prevent youth access. Failure to do so would
risk imprisonment.  The legislation has come under heavy criticism by rights
groups including Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2002). Simi-
larly under the Indian Information Technology Act 2000, the Indian Govern-
ment also declared electronic publication of pornography an offence (see
Chapter XI Para 67).
More recently, Asian governments have moved to restrict online gam-
bling. Some have looked to supplement existing legislation prohibiting gam-
bling with specific measures to combat online gambling.  On 18 February 2003
prosecutors and police raided the offices of a Taiwan advertising company that
had helped promote business for British internet sports betting company
Sportingbet. A Taipei prosecutor recently indicted Dai Chi-feng for helping to
transfer local gamblers to casinoluxy.com through a super link.  Both actions
were based on existing regulations in the Criminal Code that penalise people
who instigate others to commit crimes or make profits by engaging in gambling
(China Post, 2003). In 2002, China announced restrictions on internet cafes
under which customers were banned from looking at websites offering
prostitution, adult entertainment or gambling (Gambling Licenses Online,
2002). During 2003 legislators in South Korea discussed law revisions
subsequently introduced to the National Assembly which prevented PC rooms
and internet cafes from providing gambling or other betting services (The
Korea Times, 2003).
There have also been attempts to restrict websites that promote hatred of
ethnic and religious groups. Section 4(2)g of the Singapore Internet Code of
Conduct prohibits material that ‘glorifies, incites or endorses ethnic, racial or
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religious hatred, strife or intolerance.’ Article 5 of the Chinese Computer
Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management
Regulations, December 1997, purportedly protects ‘nationalities’. In Septem-
ber 2002, a website in Australia was ordered by the Federal Court to remove
material that casts doubt on whether the Holocaust occurred. Judge Catherine
Branson ruled that Dr Toben vilified Jewish Australians when he published
documents that cast doubt over the Holocaust on the Adelaide Institute website
(The Australian, 2002).
Legislation is not the only measure taken against such sites. Active
technological ‘blocking’ of sites is also another option employed by govern-
ments. For instance in Thailand, the Government filters access to internet
content by using a caching proxy server which delivers a ‘request denied page’
instead of the one sought by the internet user. Thai ISPs receive official
guidance from the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology
via a periodic ‘BlockURL’ message. This lists domains that ISPs are supposed
to look out for and block. About 1250 sites are blocked, most are pornographic,
a few are devoted to online gaming, and one belongs to a separatist movement
(Ignotus, 2004).
Another emerging issue is spam – unsolicited email messages. Asian
countries are looking towards countering it, with front runner Singapore
considering specific anti-spam legislation to guard against unsolicited email.
Currently, spammers who continue after their ISPs receive complaints will be
‘given the boot’. In cases such as a deliberate and malicious ‘mail-bombing’
campaign, the spanner can be charged under the Computer Misuse Act and
fined up to $S10,000 with a three-year prison sentence (Computer Times,
2003). While it might appear that such legislation is directed against unsolic-
ited commercial emails, there are also political implications. Many NGOs and
political parties use mailing lists to reach out to people in restrictive environ-
ments. Spam legislation allows governments to criminalise people or organi-
sations that send out email notices to individuals who claim that they had not
specifically asked to be put on mailing lists. Spam messaging on mobile phones
is also a growing trend in Asia as marketers use text messages to target
subscribers. In Japan, this occurs where SMS spammers generate at random
the email style addresses used for text messaging. NTT DoCoMo, Japan’s
largest mobile phone company, is taking legal action against spammers by
cutting off more than 2000 lines because of spam abuse. It has also sought
damages in some cases (Young and Kane, 2004).
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Censoring online political content
While it is true that governments in Asia were interested in developing the
economic dimension of the internet these same governments were also mindful
of the political challenge that the internet might pose (Ho et al., 2003). Their
legislation against political users of the internet reveals several trends.
Suppressing political expression
Authoritarian regimes in China and Vietnam have imposed numerous restric-
tions on cyberspace, using firewalls and arresting cyber-dissidents (Neumann,
2001). In this regard, Vietnam remains one of the world’s most repressive
countries; websites that are considered politically and morally dangerous
(including foreign news sites and those of human rights organisations) are
blocked by the Government. It is officially forbidden to use the internet for
political opposition, for actions deemed contrary to national sovereignty,
national security, morality or the law. Violators of this regulation are often
punished with imprisonment for several years. The government has plans to
make internet café owners responsible for their customer’s messages and to set
up a national monitoring system to ensure that cyber café users don’t see
‘politically or morally dangerous websites’ (RSF, 18 June 2003).
Several cyber-dissidents have been arrested, harassed or placed under
house arrest for publishing religious texts or critiques of the Government (Free
Vietnam Alliance, 2002). In January 2004, there were nine cyber dissidents in
prison or under house arrest (RSF, 2004). Nguyen Vu Binh, for example, a
former journalist who used the internet to criticise the Government, was
arrested in an internet café in Hanoi on 21 February 2002, after posting an
article in which he criticised Vietnamese-Chinese border agreements signed
in 1999. He was held in detention without trial until he was sentenced to prison
on 1 January 2004 for seven years (Index On Censorship, 2004). On 20
December 2002, cyber-dissident Nguyen Khac Toan was sentenced to 12
years in prison after he was ‘found guilty of spying for emailing material to
allegedly “reactionary” Vietnamese human rights organisations abroad’. He
was arrested in a Hanoi internet café on 8 January 2002 (IFEX, 2003).
The Chinese Communist authorities use a variety of tools to repress free
expression on the internet. These include harsh laws, stiff jail sentences,
crackdowns on internet cafés and the blocking of many ‘subversive’ websites,
such as those of CNN, BBC and Human Rights Watch. As of December 2003,
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at least 48 Chinese citizens had been arrested for expressing their opinions
through the internet (IFEX, 2003). For example, Kong Youping, a factory
worker, was arrested on 13 December 2003 at his home for posting political
articles and poems on foreign websites over the previous six months (China
Study Group, 2003). Another Chinese activist, He Depu, was sentenced to
eight years in prison on 6 November 2003 for collaborating with the Chinese
Democratic Party and posting messages on the internet ‘inciting subversion’
(IFEX, 2003).
The military junta in Burma has effectively barred all internet social
activity  and is only now beginning to allow access to a limited package of
approved websites, referred to as the ‘intranet’ (Lintner, 2001). Even then, to
a get a private connection to the internet a licence is required and high fees are
charged. The initial activation costs $US260 and a monthly fee of $US35 for
20 hours usage has to be paid (Zaw Oo, 2004). In addition these fees are in
Foreign Exchange Certificates (FEC) rather than in local currency. Most
people cannot afford these costs; thus internet use is beyond the reach of the
general population. The number of cyber-cafés  is also limited because prior
approval via a licensing system is required. Within each cafe, customers are not
allowed to access free email services such as Hotmail or Yahoo.
Legislating against electoral use of the internet
Singapore has sought to comprehensively restrict electoral internet space. It
passed a bill in 2001 to amend the Parliamentary Elections, before the last
elections in 2002. The Government set the boundaries on political campaign-
ing over the internet by barring the publication of survey and poll data. Political
web sites can publish party posters and manifestos, candidate profiles, party
events and positions on issues, and some moderated chats and discussion
forums. On the barring of election surveys and exit polls, the minister said
these gave the illusion of reflecting public opinion but were often based on
small sample sizes, bad question design and improper sampling, which led to
inaccurate and slanted results. Opposition leaders said the new law was
designed to curb their efforts to reach the electorate via the internet (Wong,
2001).
In Japan, the Government has taken steps to deal with the internet as a
medium for political campaign activities by applying ‘existing media-use
legislation in the form of the Public Offices Election Law (POEL) to political
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content that is aimed at the electorate during official election campaign
periods’. Due to the POEL and its wide range of regulations, Japan’s electoral
system has been described as one of the strictest in the world. Its strictures
constrained opposition parties from actively campaigning on the internet
during the 1998 Upper House election, but non-traditional political actors and
individuals emerged during the campaign, signaling an important trend. These
political actors established email newsletters, bulletin-board services, chat
groups, ideologically neutral portal sites, as well as ‘anti-candidate’ websites.
All of these circumvented the POEL. Unlike legislation in Singapore, the
POEL did not cover email communications, giving political parties and some
candidates the leeway to send email bulletins to subscribed members through-
out the official campaign period for the 2001 Upper House election (Tkach-
Kawasaki, 2003).
 In Korea the high number of broadband subscribers enable civic groups,
political parties and politicians to routinely use the internet. The home pages
of political parties, politicians, citizen groups become especially active during
election campaigns. However the law says little about the internet and politics
during such periods and this caused some problems in the 2002 presidential
campaign. For instance, the online media Ohmynews’ attempts to hold ‘relay
interviews’ with the front runners of the 2002 presidential election candidates
was seen to violate Article 254 of the Elections Act because the law prohibits
non-press media from having live forums just before the official campaign
period (Kyu, 2003). However, this was seen as being out of sync with
developments in new technology. Hence, unlike Singapore or Japan, plans
were made for positive legislation in 2003 to enable more online politicking
during electoral campaign periods. Nevertheless, discrimination against online
news portals remains. For instance it is well-known that Government offices’
press clubs are not open to internet reporters (Kyu, 2003).
Terrorism related suppression and legislative measures
Attempts to regulate the internet include legislation as well as policing and
suppression activities designed to restrict internet usage (e.g. surveillance,
filtering, website closures and the shutting down of cyber-cafés).
Under the label of ‘fighting terrorism’, the Pakistani Government has
taken measures that reduce the privacy of internet users. Since August 2002
cyber café owners in Pakistan have been compelled to record the names,
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connection times, numbers called and computer identities of their customers.
According to officials these records will help track down terrorists by making
emails easier to trace and this will promote security. The Government
announced that monitoring internet use would be necessary for Pakistan’s anti-
terrorism efforts. Several websites have been blocked; an al-Qaeda website
and other pages that provide ‘anti-Islamic’ or ‘blasphemous’ information
(RSF, 18 June 2003; Index On Censorship, 6 August 2002).
In Bombay, Indian police are proposing a regulation requiring customers
to show photo identification and give their addresses whenever they patronise
any of the city’s 3000 cyber-cafés. Cyber-café owners would have to retain
these records for up to a year and show them to police on request. Authorities
are fearful that terrorists and other criminals are taking advantage of cyber
cafés to communicate via email and the internet. The police have enlisted the
help of technology experts and internet service providers to trace emails in
order to track down terrorists. Although very few countries regulate internet
cafes it certainly is an emerging trend. But reports from the ground suggest that
rigour behind the record keeping varies. In some instances, anyone can walk
into a cyber café, scribble an illegible name and still get access to the internet.
To prevent people obtaining communication services anonymously, Aus-
tralian authorities no longer allow pre-paid cards for mobile phones to be sold
without identification over the counter. Convenience stores, petrol kiosks and
university campus shops which sell a variety of pre-paid mobile telephone
cards (for companies such as Optus and Telstra) require buyers to produce a
photo ID; usually a driver’s licence.  They must also indicate a local address
and phone number on a purchase form before the vendors can sell a pre-paid
card. However, account top-up cards can be purchased freely without a need
to present any ID. In countries such as Thailand, both pre-paid mobile
telephone cards and the corresponding top-up cards can be purchased without
the need to present any ID to vendors.
The Philippines and Indonesia, are preparing legislation to exercise
control over users of communication devices and services. The Philippines’
draft Anti-terrorism Bill proposes measures to sanction arrests without court
orders, initiate 30-day detentions without change, among others. It would also
allow the Secretary of Justice to authorise wiretaps, including those of internet
communications (Privacy International and the GreenNet Educational Trust,
2003). In order for wiretaps to work, there needs to be a certain amount of co-
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operation between law-enforcement agencies, telecommunications compa-
nies and internet service providers. Such co-operation is also required in cases
where the authorities want to monitor certain user accounts. No one is sure of
the extent of this cooperation (Pabico, 2003). In late 2002 a Mobile Patrol
Group (MPG) policeman traced a 17-year-old who had called up a police
station with a bomb threat. In this instance it was a simple case of the police
hotline 116 being equipped with caller ID (SunStar Network Online, 20
October 2002). The police simply went to the teenager’s house and appre-
hended him.
After the Bali bombings in 2002, Indonesia passed an Anti-Terrorism Law.
The ‘security forces can now intercept and examine information that is
expressed, sent, received or stored electronically or with an optical device, and
can detain anyone for up to three days without evidence’. They can thus
intercept emails and tap telephones (Luwarso, 2003).  Apart from law, the
perceived threat of terrorism has led to the use of high-tech tracking devices
in the search for terrorist suspects. In late 2002, Indonesian police using
technology which requires only seconds to identify the location of a cell-
phone, arrested Imam Samudra who later confessed that he was the chief
planner and coordinator of the Bali bombings (Elegant,  2002). It was reported
again in mid-2003 that the Indonesian police used similar mobile-phone
tracking technology to track and arrest members of the Jemmah Islamiah
following the Bali bombings (Elegant, 2003). This suggests that internet
communication between handheld devices can be effectively put under sur-
veillance and traced.
Cyber security conferences
Initially most cyber security conferences in Asia dealt with issues like e-
commerce, virus protection, prevention of hacker attacks and a safe online
business environment for companies and their customers. Such conferences
also cover cyber stalking, internet hour theft, data theft, cyber blackmail,
defamation of individuals and nations, and corporate espionage. Concern over
‘cyber terrorism’ was secondary. Since September 11 however, capacity-
building to counter cyber criminals has been stepped up through a series of
regional cyber security conferences. These are often supported by the United
States but jointly organised with the various local partners.
One example stems from the early cooperation between the US Federal
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) in 2000 to fight cyber crime in India. After FBI experts had trained Indian
policemen to handle computer crimes, the Indian CBI went on to establish its
own cyber crime unit. (BBC News, 23 July 2000) In February 2004, the CBI
announced that it would soon begin networking with nine other Asian
countries through a ‘Cyber Crime Technology Information Network System’
(CTINS). This was initiated by the National Police Agency of Japan
(newindpress.com, 2004). In 2003, Pakistani ‘Federal Investigation Agency’
(FIA) officers were trained to fight cyber crime by the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The new FIA unit, named ‘National Response Center for Cyber
Crimes’ (NR3C), was set up to deal with cyber crimes in Pakistan and included
plans to create a cyber security net in the country (Computer Crime Research
Center, 2003).
A conference on strengthening international law enforcement cooperation
to deal with cyber crime, was held in July 2003 by the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) eSecurity Task Group. The primary conference objec-
tives were as follows: to assist countries to develop the legal frameworks
necessary to combat computer crime; to provide law enforcement investiga-
tive units with training and equipment to investigate and deter computer crime;
and to enhance cooperation between industry and law enforcement in order to
confront computer crime (APEC, 25 July 2003). A related APEC initiative is
the ‘Cybersecurity tool kit’ which is to be developed jointly with several
business organisations including Microsoft. This ‘kit’ will enable businesses
to implement appropriate security measures to protect their systems. Busi-
nesses are also being encouraged to work with law enforcement agencies to
investigate cyber crime (APEC, 8 October 2003). Although aimed at cyber
criminals, hackers and virus authors, such measures can be used to prosecute
pranksters and legitimate cyber-activists.
Unsurprisingly, therefore on 19 September 2003, the Association of
South- East Asian Nations agreed to intensify its efforts to fight cyber crime,
hackers and computer viruses. ASEAN has set up a framework to share
information in order to respond to incidents like fast spreading viruses or other
forms of ‘cyber crime’. Each member country has set up a ‘Computer
Emergency Response Team’ (CERT) to coordinate the cooperation. ASEAN
plans to intensify and expand the information sharing in the coming years
(Reuters). These measures can be traced back to May 2002 when ASEAN
Member countries agreed on a work programme to implement the ‘ASEAN
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Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime’. This work programme
includes the online exchange of information on cyber crime activities via the
ASEAN Secretariat as well as the sharing and analysis of critical intelligence
information. Member countries also agreed to develop regional training
programmes and conferences to enhance existing capabilities for the investi-
gation, intelligence, surveillance, detection and monitoring of cyber crime on
the internet. Members agreed to exchange their ‘best practices’ in fighting
cyber criminals, including ways of tracking down emails.
In February 2004, plans were announced for a new Centre for Law-
enforcement Cooperation in Jakarta (Go, 5 February 2004). The centre will
facilitate information sharing on terrorist activities as well as conduct training
sessions for police from Asia-Pacific countries in counter-terrorism skills (Go,
6 February 2004). The centre, a joint Indonesian-Australian effort, was
discussed during a two-day conference in Bali in early February. Twenty-five
countries from the region attended and there was high-level US participation.
The problem with such capacity building is that shared expertise may be
abused by certain governments if there are no checks and balances to protect
the privacy of individuals. Such a possibility conforms with the pattern of
control over the traditional media exercised by many Asian regimes.
Surveillance and storage of data traffic
Central to the control over internet content is state ownership or regulation of
ISPs (technologies that enable internet users to be traced to their computers)
and the increased inter-state pooling of surveillance information. In Asian
countries cyberspace is a realm for surveillance. According to Lyon (2003),
surveillance is ‘focused attention on behaviours and trends of persons and of
populations with a view to managing, controlling, protecting, or influencing
them’. Like elsewhere, the internet is used in Asia for repressive and illiberal
purposes, and surveillance is the norm with its emergence as a ‘medium for
commercial, management, policing, and government activities’ (Lyon, 2003).
Online surveillance is carried out by both governments and corporations.
The governments of South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong, for
example, require internet service providers to keep information on users and
to help law enforcement agencies track their online activities. In Japan, the
Communications Interception Law was passed in August 1999, allowing law
enforcement officials access to private e-mail accounts if they were investigat-
ing certain types of crime (Williams, 2000). By law the Communications
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Authority of Thailand (CAT) has a minimum 32 per cent share in all privately-
owned ISPs. In addition the National Information Technology Committee
(NITC) has ordered ISPs to retain connection data about their customers for at
least three months. This will enable prosecutors to act against those who log
on to undesirable websites and it will encourage government authorities to
block such sites. (Reporters Without Borders, 2002)
Similarly, handheld devices such as mobile phones are also subject to
surveillance. In Singapore, the perpetrator of an unintentional bomb hoax via
a mobile phone’s short messaging system (SMS) was traced within two weeks
of the incident. This was undertaken  by the police with the cooperation of all
three telecommunications companies – Starhub, M1 and SingTel. All of them
store SMS messages in their servers or databases, for periods of time ranging
from two days to a few weeks, before they are deleted (The New Paper, 2002,
2004). The police have powers to compel telecommunications companies to
hand over information in their databases (The New Paper, 2002). Under the
Telecommunications Act, those guilty of transmitting bomb hoaxes can be
fined up to $50,000, jailed up to seven years, or both (Soh and Dawson, 2002).
Noting trends in the United States and the European Union, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has strongly criticised government
attempts to compel communication service providers to store end-user traffic
data. According to the ICC this practice is neither economically efficient nor
effective for criminal investigation. It has expressed concerns about end-users
privacy and recommended transparent and effective oversight procedures to
prevent abuses and to protect user confidence. More importantly, the ICC
recognises that there has been insufficient public input and multi-lateral
harmonisation. In its view this could impair a competitive and dynamic
communications and IT services market (International Chamber of Com-
merce, 2003).
Authoritarian governments however cite ‘national security’ or ‘internal
order’, and corporations justify their actions in terms of ‘lubricating market
mechanisms’. Accordingly, internet surveillance is promoted as ‘necessary’ in
order to ‘maintain strong states and to develop mature markets’. Accountabil-
ity and the protection of privacy, however, is inadequate (Lyon, 2003).
Conclusion: Dumbing  down democracy
Between 1998 and 2000 online political activity emerged and grew. In
response it has taken some countries a while to introduce specific cyber-
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legislation and impose restrictions.  It was not until 2000 that the Indian
government passed the Information Technology Act. Authorities in Cambodia
have so far made no efforts to regulate or restrict the internet, and Malaysia
stands by its promise not to censor internet content.  The lack of restrictions
in these countries results from indifference because of a low level of internet
penetration (thus making the medium irrelevant as a tool of political dissent).
In the case of Malaysia, the Government’s position stems from a desire not to
deter foreign investment.
By the year 2000 there were signs that restrictions upon political cyber
activism were about to emerge; this became the dominant trend subsequent to
9-11. Political expressions that blossomed with the arrival of the internet are
being brought under legislative control. As a result, the internet itself has
become a target for censorship, regulation and control.
However, the absence of specific regulations governing the internet has
not prevented governments from using other legislation and intimidation to
control internet content and cyber-dissidents. In many Asian countries the new
possibilities for free expression that accompanied the advent of the internet
still carry the old risks of persecution (Menon, 2001). The repressive practices
of media control, from the colonial era to post-colonial and contemporary
governments, have been applied to the internet and the information carried by
mobile information devices. Thus, to a large extent, the cyber security
measures resulting from the ‘war against terrorism‘ are simply an extension of
existing censorship laws and surveillance strategies.
Hence, we can question the argument that the media occupies a key
position in the development of democracy. If we regard the internet as an
extension of the mass media (in that it offers one-to-many communication via
websites and email lists) then democratic hopes appear misplaced. Given the
increased legislation against it,  new media is not as free as it was originally
deemed to be.
Democracy requires a public culture of participation, but the stringency of
post September 11 internet-related legislations seems to generate the opposite
tendency. People are more reluctant to conduct political communication
online if it can be monitored by state agencies with the cooperation of
commercial service providers. Hence, people prefer to keep important infor-
mation confidential and communicate in a low-tech or no tech manner. This is
especially so under authoritarian regimes such as Burma, Vietnam and
Singapore. In fact, many surveys show that the percentage of websites and
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news groups oriented towards politics is rather small. It has been observed that
key institutions central to democracy such as political parties have become
irrelevant in late modernity. In this view, official politics does not command
the level of support and/or participation that it did in the past. Indeed politics
itself is fragmenting, and the activist focus moves outside the formal political
process toward social movements, civil society and NGOs. But if the internet
does not live up to the demands of ‘new politics’, then old-style low tech
political organising will still be relevant.
Consequently traditional activism will still be required to get around the
high-tech surveillance state. At the same time, new media technologies can be
useful if human beings use them with ingenuity and determination.  This
underlines the central importance of the ‘people’ and their willingness to act.
It remains to be seen if further innovations in information technology will
allow cyber activists to bypass tighter government control. In the meantime the
repressive tendencies I have outlined serve to confirm that the democratic
potential of the internet is being dumbed down.
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